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Judicial Review, Reasons and Technology: A Glance at Constitutionalism 
and Democracy 
 
“If  we  want  to  study  the  problematic  relation  between  the  judiciary  and  the  legislature  without 
abandoning the perspective of legal theory, then the jurisdiction of constitutional courts provides a 
methodological point of reference.” 
Habermas, Between facts and norms, p, 238 
 
Abstract: Judicial review reflects the level of commitment between constitutionalism and democracy in 
contemporary States.  Yet democracy as the sovereign government of the people implies a tension with 
constitutionalism as the rule of law. That is, people ruling themselves or the government by the people 
–  majority  government  -  is  limited  by  the  law  of  law  making,  the  constitution.  In  Brazil,  the 
improvement of judicial review is nowadays related to increase the number of decisions given by the 
Brazilian Supreme Court or rather to the capability of this latter in deciding a large number of 
constitutional lawsuits no matter the form and content of its arguments. For, the Court is nowadays 
driven  by  numbers  and  to  accomplish  its  goals  in  terms  of  numbers  (of  decisions)  it  applies  to 
technological solutions such as the digitalization of legal proceedings. It means that as many decision 
as  Supreme  Court  issues  -with  the  help  of  technology-  the  better  it  is.  Relating  the  numbers  of 
decisions  issued  by  the  Court  to  the  improvement  of  Brazilian  judicial  review  or  Brazilian 
constitutionalism and democracy is a great mistake and a false statement as far as it does not face the 
main problem of the system, which is the lack of reasons of Supreme Court’s decision. The point is 
that, in this case, technology is just a tool –among others- in order to render legal proceedings faster 
yet not a qualitative sign of Supreme Court’s decisions. 
Keywords: Judicial review, constitutionalism, democracy and technology 
 
I. Introduction 
At the very beginning of his book Brennan and Democracy, Frank Michelmann asserts that 
“American constitutional theory is eternally hounded (...)by a search of harmony between (...) 
two  clashing  commitments:  one  the  ideal  of  government  as  constrained  by  the  law 
(“constitutionalism”),  the  other  to  the  ideal  of  government  by  act  of  the  people 
(“democracy”)”. (Michelmann, 1999, 04) This is also true for most of constitutional theory 
and constitutional practices after the terrible experiences of totalitarianism and authorianism
2 
                                                           
1 Full professor of Constitutional Law. Federal University of Parana Law School. 
2 I am referring to the event of Nazism in Germany, Stalinism in the former Soviet Union and most south -2 
and the predominance of constitutional democratic States in western societies from the second 
half of the last century on.  
If  the  settlement  of  constitutional  democracies  in  most  western  countries  has  been  a 
significant achievement in the last sixty years yet the conciliation between constitutionalism 
and democracy has still been very problematic. Democracy as the sovereign government of 
the people inevitably implies a tension with constitutionalism as the rule of law. That  is, 
people ruling themselves or the government by the people – majority government - is limited 
by  the  law  of  law  making,  the  constitution.  As  Michelmann  says,  “’Constitutionalism’ 
appears to mean something like this: The containment of popular political decision-making by 
a basic law, the Constitution – a ‘law of lawmaking,’” (Michelmann, 1999, 06) Considering 
that the Constitution for and in democracies is the outcome of a popular constituent power 
and considering that it is the basic law, then it “must be untouchable by the majoritarian 
politics  it means  to  contain.” (Michelmann, 1999, 06) This  does  not  mean (and it is  not 
desirable at all) that the constitution shields itself in face of democratic politics but it means 
that democracy and constitutionalism are, somehow, co-originary. Michelmann folds these 
two principles from the standpoint of that which can be politically decidable. And what is 
politically decidable? Can the people themselves define it? Yes and no!  
Of course the people must decide for themselves those politically decidable matters on 
moral, political and cultural grounds. But, on the other hand, some decisions taken by the 
people that turned into constitutional principles have to lay beyond the reach of majority, such 
as  the  limits  of  governmental  powers,  the  commitments  with  human  dignity,  self-
determination, liberty and equality etc. Roberto Gargarella affirms that the people not just 
impose themselves a Constitution but they claim it must be respected. (Gargarella, 1996, 127-
132).  
This paradox is somehow unavoidable and necessary and it brings some institutional 
difficulties (as Michelmann says). Some of these difficulties can be felt in the institution of 
judicial review. What  I want  to  stress  in  this paper is  (1) the role of judicial  review for 
constitutionalism and democracy; (2) the institutional believe that the improvement of judicial 
review depends on the number of decisions taken by the (constitutional) Court or rather its 
capability for deciding a large number of constitutional lawsuits (3) no matter the form and 
content of its arguments. Then the Constitutional Court is nowadays driven by numbers and to 
accomplish its goals in terms of numbers (of decisions) it makes use of technological tools 
and  solutions  such  as  the  electronic  procedure  which  leads  to  the  digitalization  of  legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
American dictatorship in the last century. 3 
proceedings.  It  means  that  as  many  decision  as  Supreme  Court  issues  -with  the  help  of 
technology- the better it is. (4) To link the numbers of decisions issued by the Court to the 
improvement of Brazilian judicial review in terms of constitutionalism and democracy is a 
great mistake and a false statement as far as it does not face the main problem of the system, 
which is the lack of justification of the Court’s decisions. 
 
II. The role of judicial review for constitutionalism and democracy 
Since the constitution of The United the States of America, the clash between federalists and 
anti-federalists, the settlement of a republic, the issues around the separation and division of 
governmental  powers  and  the  (judicial)  review  of  the  laws  have  been  at  stake.  In  the 
Federalist n. 39, in January 16, 1788, Madison says: “The first question that offers itself is, 
whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican? It is evident 
that  no  other  form  would  be  reconcilable  with  the  genius  of  the  people  of  America”. 
(Madison, 1982, 189). Further, in the Federalist n. 47, in January 30, 1877, he says that “no 
political  truth  is  certainly  of  greater  intrinsic  value  (…)  The  accumulation  of  all  powers 
legislative,  executive and judiciary in the same hands,  whether one, a  few or many, and 
whether hereditary, self appointed , or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition 
of tyranny”, (Madison, 1982, 244)  
Even before Marbury v. Madison, according to Larry Kramer, there was this sentiment 
that judges, no less than anyone else should resist unconstitutional laws. (Kramer, 2004, 39) 
Not that judges had a special competence for reviewing the decisions of parliament at that 
time but as Kramer says, every citizen had the right to refuse to recognize the validity of 
unconstitutional laws- a “’political-legal’ duty and responsibility rather than a strictly legal 
one” (Kramer, 2004, 39). Judicial review was not just one part of the eighteenth century 
constitutionalism but a very important one as far as we understand it –as Kramer does- as a 
political-legal  duty  and  responsibility  of  the  people  themselves.  Then  it  is  not  just  an 
important part of (American) constitutionalism but an important part of democracy.  
Yet  this  importance  was  not  evident  at  that  time  as  it  is  today.  To  enforce  the 
Constitution for most eighteen century American politicians and public leaders was a political 
matter either of the people or of their representatives in the Congress. So decisions from the 
legislature  should  not  be  invalidate  by  a  judge  on  behalf  of  the  Court’s  power.  Besides, 
judicial review became central for federalism and the division of authority.  
Nevertheless,  in  face  of  some  cases  (federal  and  state  cases)  some  judges  started  to 
review some acts of Congress and invalidated them justifying that they were not according to 4 
the Constitution. Finally, in the emblematic Marbury v. Madison, in 1803, Chief Justice John 
Marshall stated that the Constitution is a superior law and that an “act of the legislature, 
repugnant to the Constitution is void. (...) It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is” (Kramer, 2004, 125). Since then, judicial review 
played a fundamental role in the accomplishment of modern constitutionalism even with its 
controversial counter-majoritarian aspect or difficulty. One could say that judicial review put 
at stake the competition between democratic legislature and Constitutional Court. 
In Brazil the Supreme Court (STF) has the power to review statutes (federal and state) 
and normative acts of the executive branch in a sort of abstract and concentrated procedure 
following the German model of judicial review. Single judges, States’ Courts, Federal Courts, 
Superior  Courts  and  the  Supreme  Court  itself  have  also  the  power  to  review  them  in  a 
concrete and diffuse procedure, that is, in the course of a lawsuit as it happens in the USA. In 
this case there are no specialized courts to exercise judicial review. According to the first 
model, once Brazilian Supreme Court (as a Constitutional Court) declares that a statute or 
normative act of the executive is not constitutional it simply cannot be enforced anymore as 
the Supreme Court in this matter has the final and decisive word. Yet when it works as the 
ultimate Court of the judicial branch looking at a specific case we may say that it does judicial 
review incidentally to ordinary litigation and its final word is bound by that. 
It is noteworthy that judicial review was first introduced in Brazil in the Constitution of 
1934 precisely to maintain the federative structure. The Constitution of 1946 improved this 
idea,  that  is,  in  conflicts  between  federal  union  and  the  states  there  would  be  a  special 
procedure addressed to the Supreme Court in order to verify if the Constitution (its sensible 
principles) have been enforced by the states (acts) and if not it would justify the union’s 
intervention.  For  the  Court  should  first  declare  the  state’s  act  unconstitutional  and  then 
authorize  the  union’s  intervention.  In  1965,  the  16th  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
established the abstract and concentrated model of judicial review. However these were times 
of a weak constitutional experience: since the first Republican Constitution of 1891 Brazil 
went through two dictatorships (1937 and 1964), five Constitutions (1934, 1937, 1946, 1967 
and 1969) and a series of Institutional Acts issued by the president (authoritarian decisions 
from the executive branch converted in a supra-constitutional norm). So, judicial review as a 
key tool for constitutionalism and democracy is properly experienced in Brazil just after the 
Constitution  of  1988.  As  a  matter  of  fact  constitutionalism  with  democracy  is  a  recent 
experience lived either by the people or by institutions (public and private ones) in Brazil. 
This  is  also  due  to  the  fact  that  Brazilian  Federal  Republic  after  1988  became  a  more 5 
interventionist state with an expansion of judicial functions which “has imposed competing 
legislative tasks on the constitutional court” (Habermas, 1996, 239). 
Then,  it  is  just  in  the  last  two  decades  that  Brazil,  particularly  its  Supreme  Court, 
experiences an explosion in demands (for democracy) as a result of political, social, cultural 
and  economic  changes.  Legal  scholars  and  political  scientists  have  looked  to  this 
phenomenon, on the one hand, as the exercise of democracy by the people who claim their 
rights and the right to enforce the Constitution through the Courts and, on the other hand, as a 
loss  in  democratic  self-government  as  far  as  judges  are  not  elected,  they  are  just  a  few 
illuminated people to declare invalid a decision from the people or their representatives and 
their decisions are not accountable to the people.  
In  spite  of  this  controversy  around  the  counter-majoritarian  difficult  faced  by 
Constitutional  Courts  in  reviewing  decisions  from  the  legislature,  the  Supreme  Court  in 
Brazil, as I said above, has experienced an explosion in demands in the last two decades and 
in  the  last  decade  it  has  taken  some  procedures  in  order  to:  1.  decrease  the  number  of 
demands; 2. increase the number of decisions or rather its capability in deciding a larger 
number of constitutional cases 3. no matter the form or content of the arguments of such 
decisions 4. with the help of computer’s and informatics technology. To make a long story 
short, Chief Justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court in the last decade have a strong believe 
that the difficulties of constitutionalism and democracy can be minimized (and the Court be 
better off) as it is just a matter of numbers. 
 
III. The institutional believe that the improvement of judicial review depends on the 
number  of  decisions  taken  by  the  (constitutional)  Court  or  rather  its  capability  for 
deciding a large number of constitutional lawsuits. 
Brazilian judicial power has changed in the past ten years. In 2004, for instance, the 45
th 
amendment to the Constitution changed 25 articles and added 4 more.
3 This change affected 
most the judicial branch and legal proceedings in order to have a more efficient structure. 
New institutions and new procedures were created.
4  Most recent changes have to do with the 
process of digitalization of legal procedures in order to get even more efficiency. Not much in 
the concentrated model but in the diffuse model of judicial review the process of digitalization 
                                                           
3 Articles changed of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 by the 45
th Amendment: 5, 36, 52, 92, 93, 95, 98, 99, 
102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134 and 168. Articles added to the 
Constitution: 103-A, 103-B, 111-A and 130-A. 
4 The 45
th amendment created the National Council of Justice in charge of supervising the judicial branch and 
controlling its administrative and financial management, as well as, its member and all of its proceedings  (see 
article 103-B, section. 4). 6 
has improved the time of decisions and their numbers. That is, most of the cases judged by the 
Supreme Court are extraordinary appeals. For instance, from 1988 to 2011 (in 23 years), 1117 
constitutional claims of one kind (ADI-Unconstitutional Straight Procedure) were judged by 
the Supreme Court while in 2010, 6735 extraordinary appeals were accepted by the Supreme 
Court to be judged.
5  
In June, 2007 the Supreme Court started the process of digitalization of its proceedings in 
order to save time and money and gain in efficiency. Then, benefits from digital proceedings 
are 1. to access proceedings’ data from anywhere; 2. by any interested part or legal official; 3. 
the shortening of time regarding all procedure; 4. then, the economy of time and money for 
either the State or individuals. 
I do recognize the gain in time and maybe in money in having all legal proceedings 
digitalized. I also accept the fact that a faster legal proceeding is better in terms of the rights at 
stake in any litigation. I also understand that just eleven Justices of the Supreme Court have a 
limited capacity for deciding in considering the huge number of demands. I do know that 
technology can help to optimize the decision-making process. But I am not very sure if these 
are authoritative reasons to believe that Brazilian judicial review (concentrated and diffuse) 
will  be  better  off  and,  accordingly,  Brazilian  constitutionalism  and  democracy  just  with 
instrumental solutions such as digitalizing procedures, reducing the numbers of appeals and 
thus  the  number  of  cases  submitted  to  the  Courts,  especially  to  the  Supreme  Court.  My 
argument is that it is not just a matter of numbers or a problem of mean, as the last Supreme 
Court Chief Justices insist to state. Former Chief Justice Gilmar Mendes in an interview said: 
“In modern society where there are mass demands, solutions cannot be individualized.(…) 
There is a culture in the Judicial Power in maintaining originality even when the theme have 
already an established understanding by Superior Courts. Then these exotic decisions will 
later  be  repealed  (…)”.  (Free  translation)  He  also  highlighted  that  “sumulas  vinculantes 
(binding  judicial  statements  issued  by  Supreme  Court  on  the  basis  of  a  precedent)  and 
repercussão geral (general repercussion of subject-matters because of their legal, political, 
social and economic relevance)” are two new legal proceedings that can solve the problem 
concerning the huge number of demands at the Supreme Court.
6 Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Cesar Peluso  to  the question  if the Court is ready  to  work  with  electronic  procedure, 
answered: “The secretaria judiciária (the Supreme Court office in charge of it) is more or less 
                                                           
5 http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estatistica&pagina=adi. Access May, 4th, 2011. 
6 Interview with former Brazilian Supreme Court Chief Justice Gilmar Ferreira Mendes in a Seminar organized 
by  São  Paulo  Industry  Federation  (FIEP),  December,  2008.  See 
http://ultimainstancia.uol.com.br/conteudo/noticia/PARA+GILMAR+MENDES+JUDICIARIO+ARCA+COM+
MONOPOLIO+DA+SOLUCAO+DE+CONFLITOS_59607.shtml Access May, 5
th, 2011. 7 
structured for such transition. We have already had some electronic results. Lawsuits whose 
original competency is of the Supreme Court arrive all in electronic form; we will not receive 
them in paper anymore”.
7 (Free translation) He also made more compliments to these new 
technological tools and to these new procedural measures such as “binding judicial statements 
issued by the Court and general repercussion”.
8  
The main problem of Brazilian Courts and specially its Supreme Court is the lack of 
deliberation, discussion and strong arguments of its decisions concerning, principally, judicial 
review. I admit that the changes produced by this on-going technological process of Court’s 
proceedings modernization with the help of informatics are noteworthy. Nevertheless all this 
technological apparatus does not solve the lack of true deliberation in the Court and strong 
justification mainly in cases of judicial review. 
 
IV. Increasing numbers; yet weakening constitutionalism and democracy  
The two last topics of my paper focus 1. on the lack of deliberation and justification (reasons) 
of Supreme Court decisions which weakens Brazilian constitutionalism and democracy and 2. 
on the fallacious understanding that solving the problem of having a huge number of demands 
and offering a huge numbers of decisions our Court will be an exemplary one. 
A short theoretical excursion. Supreme Court decisions on constitutional cases are not 
just decisions of any kind but they have satisfy criteria of legal certainty and of rational 
acceptability (Habermas, 1996, 238) Besides, they are constitutionally bound by the principle 
of separation of powers without the judiciary’s encroaching on legislative powers (Habermas, 
1996, 238) Supreme Court not just review statutes but it has an affirmative attitude towards 
basic  rights.  That  is,  to  review  statues  is  also  to  deal  with  hard  cases  about  basic  rights 
(individual, collective, social and whatever rights) where principles come into play. For this 
very reason the Court’s argument is different from the legislature whose function is not “to 
check whether the courts, in applying the law, make use of exactly those normative reasons 
that  appeared  in  the  presumptively  rational  justification  of  a  legal  statute  on  the  part  of 
legislator” (Habermas, 1996, 242).  In other words, the Court must present reasons of another 
kind which implies a constructive interpretation by its officials, responsive to context and 
consistent with the legal system as a whole.  
                                                           
7 Interview with Brazilian Supreme Court Chief Justice Cesar Peluso to the Brazilian Labor Judges Association. 
(AMATRA),  January,  11th,  2011  http://www.amatra9.org.br/na-midia/entrevista-ministro-cezar-peluso-
presidente-do-stf-e-do-cnj.html Access May 5th, 2011. 
8 It is noteworthy that in the case of  general repercussion, its acknowledgement by the Court is done by means 
of a system of informatics that provides a kind of electronic deliberation without the need of an physical meeting 
of Justices. 8 
Following  Dworkin’s  right  answer  thesis,  each  case  brought  into  Court  has  to  be 
interpreted in terms of the entirety of a rationally reconstructed legal order. Thus, the Court 
cannot but construct its answer based on an argumentation-theoretic criterion of that which 
applies constitutional norms (principles) and does not justify them. Judicial review according 
to this makes use of a discourse of application in the sense that it reconstructs constitutional 
principles (and guarantees democratic procedures) at the same time it grants a basic rights 
through the “right answer”. Formally universal norms (principles) are applied to particular 
situations. 
Even justified with a high standard of abstraction and generality norms cannot foresee all 
situations so, another kind of argument is needed to discursively appropriate the norm to the 
(new) situation or context. Norms are, then, recontextualized at the moment they are applied. 
This  is  the  Herculean  task  of  Supreme  Court  Justices  or  participants  in  the  application 
discourse and the interpretative attitude they must have towards the Constitution in order to 
apply the appropriate norm. 
A  constructive  model  of  adjudication  such  as  Dworkin’s  satisfies  the  kind  of 
argumentation Justices should have. First, because their interpretation draws on a principle 
according  to  which  people  should  be  treated  with  equal  concern  and  respect.  Then, 
constitutional adjudication in its best sense express an equal concern for the people. Second, 
because Dworkin stresses the argumentative character of legal practice from an internal point 
of view, the point of view of the participant in the practice (the interpreter).  
The  interpreter  or  participant  takes  the  practices  as  part  of  a  narrative  he  interprets. 
“Interpretation folds back into the practice, altering its shape, and the new shape encourages 
further reinterpretation, so the practice changes dramatically, though each step in the progress 
is interpretative of what the last achieved”. (Dworkin, 1986, 48) As Habermas points out, 
Dworkin “looks to an ambitious theory that enables one, especially in hard cases, to justify 
the individual decision by its coherence with rationally reconstructed history of existing law 
(…). Coherence between statements is established by substantial arguments (…), and hence 
by  reasons  that  have  the  pragmatic  property  of  bringing  about  a  rationally  motivated 
agreement among participants in argumentation”. (Habermas, 1996, 211)  
Unfortunately Brazilian Supreme Court practices are far from being reflexive, dialogical 
and coherent in the strong sense of each of these attributes.  
It is first necessary an explanation on how the Court works. They are eleven Justices. 
According to the Brazilian Constitution (art. 101, par.1) they must be Brazilians citizens with, 
at  least,  thirty-five  years  old  and  not  older  than  sixty-five  years  old.  They  have  to  have 9 
notorious legal knowledge and very good reputation. They are appointed by the President and 
the Senate has to (by absolute majority) approve the nomination before they get in office. 
They can stay in office until they are seventy years old. Except by the fact that the Senate 
must approve the President’s nomination, there is no public debate around their indication and 
further nomination considering the criteria of notorious legal knowledge and reputation.  The 
first considers, for instance, academic profile as well as professional skills from a very broad 
sense. Almost everything counts for such criteria. Reputation is more seen from a formal 
point of view than a substantial one. There is no sense of popular responsibility in substantial 
terms and their republican commitment is limited to the strict sense of playing an official 
legal function. That is, since their nomination, Justices do not have to give reasons. They do 
not  have  to  articulate  their  arguments,  and  not  even  in  the  exercise  of  constitutional 
adjudication besides their own (private) convictions, opinions, believe and theoretical bias. 
For this reason I affirm that there is no reflexivity in their practices. 
Concerning coherence it is noteworthy that the 45
th Amendment to article 93, IX, X of 
the Constitution (December, 8
th, 2004) asserts that all judgments of judicial power will be 
public and all decisions will be reasoned (…) and administrative decisions of the Courts will 
be motivated and public. The amendment to the article above in both sections (IX and X) 
reaffirms  the  public  character  of  legal  and  administrative  proceedings  which  is  itself  a 
fundamental  right  and  a  constitutional  principle  as  one  can  see  in  article  5,  LX  of  the 
Constitution. It  also reaffirms the need of reasons for legal decisions  which it is directly 
linked to the application of law, the very idea of adjudication, and the function of judicial 
power respecting the principle of the separation of powers. Somehow coherence has to do 
with offering reasons in a judicial decision and it is more than that.  
For Dworkin coherence is attained in the process of (constructive) interpretation and it is 
more than the absence of logical contradiction, that is, ‘bare’ consistency. Coherence means 
consistency in principle, which “requires that the various standards governing the state’s use 
of  coercion  against  its  citizens  be  consistent  in  the  sense  they  express  a  single  and 
comprehensive  vision  of  justice”  (Dworkin,  1986,  134).  This  ‘single  and  comprehensive 
vision of justice’ that makes law strongly consistent depends on (is viscerally linked to) the 
notion of integrity.  
Integrity in “legislation restricts what our legislators and other lawmakers may properly 
do in expanding and changing our public standards”. (Dworkin, 1986, 217) and integrity in 
adjudication “requires our judges, so far it is possible, to treat our present system of public 
standards as expressing and respecting a coherent set of principles, and, to the end, to interpret 10 
these standards to find implicit standards between and beneath the explicit one”. (Dworkin, 
1986, 217)   
Integrity  calls  for  coherence  in  principle  regarding  our  public  standards  and  “law  as 
integrity asks judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a 
coherent set of principles” (Dworkin, 1986, 243) and it asks them to enforce them. For it is 
necessary an interpretative and critical attitude towards them as far as people have rights that 
follow from past decisions of political institutions and go beyond conventions and must be 
enforced (through them). 
Coherence requires, then, argumentation at the pragmatic level, that is, the interpreter 
(the Supreme Court Justice) is not an external observer and his or her arguments demands 
discussion and deliberation among those who are participants in the process of argumentation 
(adjudication). According to Günther (1995, 293) there is not a coherent system of all valid 
norms or standards as it depends on the situation of application whose complete description 
changes the matrix of the norms that are potentially in conflict. In this case the participant 
accepts the disorganized set of valid principles which in each situation of application becomes 
organized by means of a reconstructive attitude in order to come to a right answer. Thus, 
coherence  is,  at  least,  a  necessary  condition  to  the  justification  of  interpretation  of  legal 
norms. 
My point is that most  of Brazilian Supreme Court decisions  on judicial review lack 
coherence and integrity in the sense Dworkin talks about or in any strong sense. I support my 
point based on the average standard of arguments used by the Court in its decisions. In a 
recent research about legislature procedure and judicial review done by a group of Brazilian 
researchers from the Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning, the Law and Democracy 
Group (NDD/CEBRAP)
910, they observed that most of the Justices make use of a kind of an 
argument of authority. An argument of authority is based on the reputation or status of a 
person or a group of people. The argument is valid because is uttered by such person or group 
of people.
11 Its legitimacy is a matter of a personal charisma or any other attribute. They can 
be of three sorts: 1. an argument of authority based on the legal scholarship. In this case, it is 
important to quote parts of a text of some famous legal scholar to support the argument of the 
                                                           
9  CEBRAP/NDD.  Brazilian  Center  of  Analysis  and  Planning.  Law  and  Democracy  Group  of  Research. 
Members:  Marcos  Nobre  (Coordinator),  José  Rodrigo  Rodriguez  (Coordinator),  Luciana  Gross  Cunha 
(Consulting), Geraldo Miniuci, Nathalie Bressiani, Fabiola Fanti, Ana Carolina Alfinito Vieira, Carolina Cutrupi 
Ferreira, Luciana Silva Reis, Mariana Giorgetti Valente 
10  See  CEBRAP’s  report:  http://portal.mj.gov.br/main.asp?View={329D6EB2-8AB0-4606-B054-
4CAD3C53EE73} Acess on May 9
th, 2011. 
11  See  CEBRAP’s  report:  http://portal.mj.gov.br/main.asp?View={329D6EB2-8AB0-4606-B054-
4CAD3C53EE73} p. 53. Acess on May, 9
th, 2011. 11 
decision and not to analyze and raising a problem in the case in a sort of dialogue with the 
quoted  author;  2.  an  argument  of  authority  based  on  the  precedents.  In  this  case,  past 
decisions’ quotations are taken and are supportive of an idea just because of their authoritative 
source and not because of their paradigmatic and historical value in the bulk of decisions 
issued by the Court. Their grounds and theoretical motivations are practically needless and 3. 
an  argument  of  authority  external  to  the  legal  scholarship  from  other  experts  such  as 
sociologists, anthropologists, medical doctors, engineers, etc. This kind of argument allows 
one to identify which external authority is in the argumentation and its importance or weight. 
12 Another remarkable analysis of this research concerns the peculiar use Justices make of 
quotations of various legal scholars in their arguments.  
So, the problem of our Constitutional Court is not the huge number of demands it has as 
it works with both concentrated and diffuse mode of judicial review but the lack of reasons or 
integrity (reflexivity, dialogue and coherence) of its decisions. With the help of technology 
the Court can come to a large number of decisions per year. This is relevant but not the most. 
The introduction of technology such as the use of electronic procedure  -which implies the 
digitalization of legal proceedings- are very helpful as it makes the procedure faster and safer 
in many cases and it leads to a larger number of decisions increasing the efficiency of the 
Court. But constitutionalism and democracy is not a ma tter of efficiency but of (enforcing) 
rights and to enforce them rather than numbers one needs reasons. 
 
V. Bibliography 
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2011. 
CHUEIRI, Vera Karam de e GODOY, Miguel Gualano. Constitucionalismo e democracia –  
Soberania e poder constituinte. Revista Direito GV. n. 11, 159-176, 2010. 
DWORKIN, Ronald. A Matter of Principle. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1985. 
_____. Freedom’s Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
_____. Law’s Empire. London: Fontana Press, 1986. 
_____. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1982. 
GARGARELLA, Roberto. La Justiticia Frente al Gobierno: Sobre el carácter  
contramayoritario del poder judicial. Barcelona: Ariel, 1996 
GUNTHER, Klaus. Un concepto normativo de coherencia para una teoría de la 
argumentación juridica. Doxa. 17-18, 1995. 
                                                           
12  See  CEBRAP’s  report:  http://portal.mj.gov.br/main.asp?View={329D6EB2-8AB0-4606-B054-
4CAD3C53EE73} p. 53. Acess on May 9
th, 2011 12 
HABERMAS, Jürgen. Between facts and norms. Contributions to a discourse theory of law 
and democracy. Trans. by William Rehg. Cambridge, Mass.,: The MIT Press, 1996.  
_____. Justification and application. Remarks on discourse ethics. Cambridge, Mass and 
London: The MIT Press, 1995. 
_____. Frank Michelman and ‘Democracy vs. Constitutionalism’ (paper) 
HAMILTON, Alexander, MADISON, James, JAY, John. The federalist papers. New York: 
Bantam Books, 1982. 
KRAMER, Larry. The people themselves. Popular Constitucionalism and judicial review. 
New York,: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
INTERVIEW. 
http://ultimainstancia.uol.com.br/conteudo/noticia/PARA+GILMAR+MENDES+JUDICI
ARIO+ARCA+COM+MONOPOLIO+DA+SOLUCAO+DE+CONFLITOS_59607.shtm
l Access May, 5
th, 2011. 
INTERVIEW. http://www.amatra9.org.br/na-midia/entrevista-ministro-cezar-peluso-
presidente-do-stf-e-do-cnj.html Access May 5th, 2011. 
MICHELMAN Frank I. Brennan and democracy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999. 
NETTO, Menelick de Carvalho e SCOTTI, Guilherme. Os direitos fundamentais e a 
(in)certeza do Direito. Belo Horizonte: Editora Fórum, 2011.  
NINO, Carlos Santiago. La constituición de la democracia deliberativa. Barcelona: Editorial 
Gedisa, 1997 
RELATÓRIO. Centro Brasileiro de Análises e Planejamento. Núcleo Direito e Democracia. 
(NDD/CEBRAP). Processo Legislativo e Controle de Constitucionalidade: as fronteiras 
entre direito e política. São Paulo. http://portal.mj.gov.br/main.asp?View={329D6EB2-
8AB0-4606-B054-4CAD3C53EE73} 
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL. 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estatistica  
 
Address: 
Vera Karam de Chueiri 
vkchueiri@uol.com.br 
Rua Conselheiro araujo 192, AP. 01 
Curitiba, PR, 80060-230, Brasil 
 